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NOTES & COMMENTS
EXAMINING OKLAHOMA'S MATERNAL
PREFERENCE DOCTRINE: GORDON v.
GORDON
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, sex discrimination has been subjected to vary-
ing degrees of constitutional review. Therefore it is not surprising that
statutory influences on familial relationships which rely upon the dif-
ferences in sex are being challenged on this basis. Thus a statute
which creates a presumption that, all other things being equal, the
mother shall be preferred over the father as the legal custodian of a
young child may be attacked under the fourteenth amendment as a
denial of equal protection.
Recently, one such statute' withstood an equal protection review
in Gordon v. Gordon.2 This note will analyze the decision rendered by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in this case. In so doing, it will be nec-
essary to examine the application of this statute and the level of scru-
tiny by which its constitutionality should be judged. Initially,
however, it is necessary to consider the factual setting of the case as
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1971). The statute appears as follows:
§ 11. Rules for appointment. In awarding the custody of a minor, or in ap-
pointing a general guardian, the court or judge is to be guided by the following consider-
ations:
1. By what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect to its temporal
and its mental and moral welfare; and if the child be of sufficient age to form an intelli-
gent preference, the court or judge may consider that preference in determining the ques-
tion.
2. As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship, neither
parent is entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the child be of tender
years, it should be given to the mother, if it be of an age to require education and prepa-
ration for labor or business, then to the father.
2. 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla. 1977). Justices Irwin, Berry, Simms, and Doolin concurred with
Chief Justice Hodges. Justice Williams joined Justice Barnes who concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. Vice Chief Justice Lavender dissented.
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well as the historical precedents within Oklahoma for the court's deci-
sion.
Following a line of Oklahoma cases,3 the decision in Gordon re-
versed the trial court which had awarded custody of a three year old
child to the father despite absence of proof of the mother's unfitness.
The court maintained that, although the testimony revealed that each
parent was equally capable of fulfilling the needs of the child, the
mother would presumptively be better able to further the best interests
of the child4 pursuant to title 30, section 11 of the Oklahoma Statutes,5
commonly referred to as the "maternal preference doctrine". Despite
the father's contention that the statute inherently denied him equal pro-
tection through a gender-based distinction, the court declined to find
that a suspect classification, mandating strict judicial scrutiny, had been
created.6 Conversely, the court adhered to the belief that the statute
was based upon a rational distinction7 which supported the presump-
tion and could only be overcome by evidence that the mother was an
unfit parent. While the court acknowledged landmark decisions of the
United States Supreme Court regarding sex discrimination, 8 its analy-
sis, although lacking substantial support, concluded that the statute was
reasonably related to the pronounced legislative objective. 9 Addition-
ally, the court stated that the post-trial special master's award of tempo-
rary custody to the mother was correct on the basis of the facts
presented at that time and that further consideration of those facts was
not needed at this time to determine visitation rights and child support
requirements.10
3. See e.g., Conrad v. Conrad, 443 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1968); Earnst v. Earnst, 418 P.2d 351
(Okla. 1966); Irwin v. Irwin, 416 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1966); Roemer v. Roemer, 373 P.2d 55 (Okla.
1962); Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 290 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1955).
4. 577 P.2d at 1277.
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §11 (1971).
6. 577 P.2d at 1277.
7. Id. The court substantiated this decision on the basis of Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 996
(Utah 1975), which found wisdom in traditional family patterns holding that the children should
be in the care of their mother.
8. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9. The objective is basically the maintenance of the child's "best interests". 577 P.2d at
1276.
10. Id. at 1277.
1978]
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II. APPLICATION OF THE MATERNAL PREFERENCE DOCTRINE IN
OKLAHOMA
Title 30, section 11 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides guidelines
for judicial determination of custody or guardianship of minor chil-
dren. The statute emphasizes that the best interests of a child with
respect to its moral and temporal welfare are important considerations
in making such a determination. The statute also indicates that when
parents dispute custody and all other factors are equal, a child of
tender years should be given to the mother. Alternatively, if the child
is at an age which requires education and preparation for business, the
father should be awarded custody. 1 This statutory language indicates
that the "best interests" of the child12 is the primary concern, while the
determination of which parent should be entitled to custody is secon-
dary. The Oklahoma courts have repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of the "best interest" concept in considering the question of
custody of minor children by regarding the welfare of the child as the
paramount concern.1 3  The right of a parent to the custody of a minor
child has been viewed as being subject to the court's perceptions of the
advancement of the child's welfare. 14
11. Although the entire statute may be constitutionally questionable, this paper will only
evaluate the subsection which prefers the mother as the custodial parent of a child of tender years.
The issues raised in OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11(2) are similar to those discussed in relation to
the maternal preference rule. A presumption which assumes a father will necessarily be more
able to provide educational guidance or business preparation could be factually disputed and
would be subject to the same constitutional arguments discussed in the text.
12. In 1925, Judge Cardozo enunciated the best interests theory which presently pervades
most child custody legislation throughout the United States. He stated:
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction ... does not proceed upon the theory that
the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed
against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the
child.... He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to compose
their private differences. He is not determining rights "as between a parent and a child,"
or as between one parent and another .... Equity does not concern itself with such
disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is for the child.
Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925).
13. See Conrad v. Conrad, 443 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1968); Eamst v. Earust, 418 P.2d 351 (Okla.
1966); Perry v. Perry, 408 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1965).
14. Adams v. Adams, 294 P.2d 831 (Okla. 1956); In re Davis, 206 Okla. 405, 244 P.2d 555
(1952). See Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d at 1277, where the Court stated: "[Tihis statute is not
concerned entirely with the 'rights' of parents to their children. In addition to, and far beyond,
their rights, the paramount purpose of the statute is to serve the welfare and best interests of
children." However, the Oklahoma courts have suggested that they consider the claims of both
parents, under their natural rights, to custody of the children in a divorce action. Sullins v. Sul-
lins, 280 P.2d 1009 (Okla. 1955). In a proposed change of custody care, the best interest of the
child should be the paramount guide, but rights and desires of father and mother should be given
consideration where both are shown to be qualified and worthy to have such custody. Mahan v.
Moore, 198 Okla. 67, 175 P.2d 345 (1947). Unfortunately, the claimed equality of treatment to-
3
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The Child's Best Interests
The problem with the courts' strong adherence to both the "best
interests" axiom and the wording of the statute is that the preference
for the mother and the welfare of the child are seen as synonymous.
The illogical merging of the two principles is best exemplified in Irwin
v. Irwin5 which raises the love of a mother to a quality divine in ori-
gin. The rhetoric of Irwin, plus the fact that the mother receives cus-
tody of the children in well over ninety percent of all divorces,1 6
illustrates that Oklahoma courts equate the best interests of the child
with a mother's right to custody. An arbitrary doctrine such as
Oklahoma's maternal preference rule inhibits inquiry into the true best
interests of the child.'7
Citing a decision of the Supreme Court of Utah,"8 the court in
Gordon found that the welfare of children is furthered by adherence to
ward both fathers and mothers becomes suspect in view of the language of the custody statute
itself and its actual application by the courts.
15. 416 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1966).
[C]ourts know that mother love is a dominant trait in the heart of a mother, even in the
weakest of women. It is of divine origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds and sur-
passes the parental affection of the father. Every just man recognizes the fact that minor
children need the constant bestowal of the mother's care and love. It is for these reasons
courts are loath to deprive the mother of the care and custody of her children, and will
not do so, as above remarked, unless it clearly appears that she is an improperperson to be
intrusted with their care and custody.
Id. at 858.
16. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modem American Family Law, 2 J. FAM. L. 101, 102
(1962).
17. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 423, 441 [hereinafter cited as
Foster & Freed]; UNIoFa MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402 (1971), which sets forth the
standards for court determination of custody, as follows:
§ 402. (Best Interest of Child) The court shall determine custody in accordance with
the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.
See also Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. Rav. 51 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Podell, Peck & First]. The preference of the child in custody disputes is only one
aspect of the best interests test. However, in most cases the child's welfare will be best served if
placed with the preferred parent. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 442, 443. The child's prefer-
ence also raises interesting constitutional questions related to the area of children's rights. Tradi-
tionally, the parents' wishes have been equated with the child's wishes; but, particularly in custody
disputes, children are emerging as autonomous, independent beings whose personal interests de-
mand attention. See Baskin, State Intrusion Into Fami Affairs: Justfcations andLimitations, 26
STAN. L. Rv. 1383, 1390 (1974).
18. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975).
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the traditional notion that essential biological differences make mothers
better custodians than fathers.19 By this finding, the Oklahoma court
clings to the concept that theoretical ties of love and affection supersede
established, associational ties which current writers in the behavioral
sciences recognize as essential prerequisites for realistic love.20
Awarding custody of children to a mother on the basis of an anachro-
nistic concept 2' that mothers by their unique nature have psychologi-
cally healthy bonds of love toward their children creates a preference
based on theory, not on the actual, realistic relationship between a par-
ent and child. In contrast to this questionable presumption, an in-
creasing trend toward awarding custody to fathers illustrates a
19. Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d at 1277. Warren v. Warren, 365 P.2d 974 (Okla. 1961).
"Mother love" must be recognized as a major factor in cases dealing with children of tender years.
Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 290 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1955). If a mother is a fit person to care for her
children, the courts will not deprive her of them. See also Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okla.
317, 229 P.2d 602 (1951), which held that where the mother was a fit custodian, the court had a
duty to award exclusive custody to her. In Roemer v. Roemer, 373 P.2d 55 (Okla. 1962), although
there was competent expert evidence to show that the father would have been a proper person to
have custody of the son, the trial court was found not to have abused its direction in awarding
custody to the mother.
20. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 437.
21. The popular theories before the 1960's concerning maternal deprivation, however, did at
one time lend some scientific credibility to the assumptions made by the Oklahoma statute, J.
Bowlby, MENTAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH (1952). The author also states:
[W]hen deprived of maternal care, the child's development is almost always retarded
physically, intellectually, and socially-and symptoms of physical and mental illness
may appear . . . Skeptics may question whether the retardation is permanent and
whether the symptoms of illness may not easily be overcome. The retrospective and
follow-up studies make it clear that such optimism is not always justified and that some
children are gravely damaged for life. This is a sombre conclusion which now must be
regarded as established.
Id. at 11. See also Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the
Future Development of the Laws Governing the Settlement ofInter-Parental Child Custody Disputes,
11 FAM. LJ. 562, 563 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bradbrook]. The flaw with the studies emerges,
though, when it is pointed out that such studies are one-sided and present no information about
"paternal" deprivation. Therefore, the maternal deprivation studies should be viewed as data
dealing with the question of "parental" deprivation in general. Id. at 563. If one accepts the
conclusion that maternal deprivation by itself will have detrimental affects on a child, one must
assume the father is incapable of undertaking the "mothering function" which indeed is what the
legislature and courts have done in implenting the maternal preference statute in child custody
disputes. Such an interpretation ignores the more recent evidence that "mothering" is not neces-
sarily a biological function, that deprivation of a father's time and affection also may have detri-
mental effects on a child, and that courts should not mechanically assume a mother is more able to
devote time and attention to a child's mental and physical welfare, given the present sociological
climate of this country. As women have begun to loosen the traditional ties that bound them only
to the role of homemaker and mother, so too have men begun to be less bound to the role of
"breadwinner" and more cognizant of the fact that being a loving, involved parent is a worthwhile
endeavor. See Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285,290 (1973). Mothering is a function which can
be and often is independent of the sex of the person providing it. Yarrow, Maternal.Deprivatlox
Toward an Empiricaland ConeptualRe-Evaluation, 58 PSYCH. BULL. 475-79 (1961). "The prena-
tal tie of a child to its mother is biological, but after birth the tie is socially and culturally pre-
scribed." Lott, Who Wants the Children?, 28 AM. PSYCH. 573, 581 (1972).
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recognition in some jurisdictions that the best interests of the child can-
not logically be equated with automatic custody in the mother.22
The Father's Burden of Proving Unfitness
In conjunction with erroneously equating a child's "best interests"
with a mother's preferred right to custody, Oklahoma courts have con-
strued the statute as requiring that, in order for the father to obtain
custody, he must clearly show that awarding custody to the mother
would actually work to the child's detriment. In effect, the courts have
ignored the equal footing language of the statute.
Irwin, which is cited in Gordon, elevates this construction to a ju-
dicial pronouncement "[tihat this case is a proper one for application of
the above mentioned statutory preference of the mother (as it pertains
to children of tender years) and of the rule which requires it to clearly
appear that she is 'an improper person' before being deprived of that
preference."23  Such interpretations of the statute virtually eliminate
any practical significance of the phrase "other things being equal."
The mother's position becomes superior to the father's, and he must
prove other things are not equal, by showing the mother's parental in-
competence.24 Realistically, although a father may be an adequate
and quite competent custodian for his children and could serve their
best interests, preference is given the mother unless he can prove her to
be unfit.
Proving a mother's unfitness is extremely difficult and often results
in court proceedings which, because of a prolongation of the bitterness
and hostility frequently present in a divorce action, work against rather
than foster the best interests of the child.25 Oklahoma courts speak in
generalities about fitness and provide little guidance as to what specific
22. "In 1967, over 15,200,000 wives worked outside the home and the number of two income
families is ever growing to meet higher costs of educating children, provide health care and keep
up with the American standard of living." Rawalt, Litigating Sex Discrimination Cases, 3 FAm.
L. Q. 44 at 44 n.1 (1970). For an extensive list of recent cases in which custody was awarded to
the father, see Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 436-37 n.64.
23. -Irwin v. Irwin, 416 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1966); accord, Waller v. Waller, 439 P.2d 952 (Okla.
1968).
24. The Gordon decision in effect announced that a mother must be shown to be unfit before
custody will be awarded to a father. "The gender preferences of 30 O.S. 1971, §11, are intended
to direct the trial court's determination of custody only when the scales are relatively balanced
between the attributes of both parents, and the statute should be used only in such a situation."
577 P.2d at 1277.
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evidence will meet this high standard.26 In Roemer v. Roemer,27 for
instance, the defendant father introduced undisputed psychiatric, testi-
mony that he was a proper person to provide nurturing and love for his
son and might better serve his emotional growth. The testimony also
indicated that the mother appeared to be rejecting the child. The
mother was not characterized as a moral degenerate, however, and the
court awarded her custody of the child.
Exactly what guidelines Oklahoma courts apply in determining
the question of "fitness" remains unclear.28  The standard is an elusive
thread tightly intertwined with the presumption favoring the mother.
In many states, the criteria considered by a judge often fails to include
relevant factual, medical, psychological and social evaluations.29 Sim-
ilarly, the Oklahoma courts' failure to consider such pertinent evalua-
tions result in an onerous burden for the father seeking custody. He
must challenge the mother's parental fitness before his own qualifica-
tions are placed on an equal footing in consideration of the child's best
interest.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MATERNAL PREFERENCE
DOCTRINE
The maternal preference rule embodied in the Oklahoma statute is
discriminatory on its face and discriminatory as applied by the courts.
Because of the arbitrary nature of the maternal preference presump-
tion, the lack of any rational relation between the statute and the best
interests of a child, and the nature of the interests involved in custody
determinations, the statute should be susceptible to challenge under the
constitutional standards of equal protection.30
26. The language of the courts often reads like the vague standard in Waller v. Waller, 439
P.2d at 956, which states that "before a mother is deprived of the custody of her children of tender
years, it must clearly appear that she is an improper person to be entrusted with it."
27. 373 P.2d 55 (Okla. 1962).
28. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Irwin agreed with the Shrout v. Shrout, 244 Or. 521,
356 P.2d 935 (1960), relied on by the defendant-father, which stated that a mother's moral trans-
gressions were relevant in determining what is best for the children, and whether she would be a
fit guardian. However, the court qualified this aspect of "fitness" by pointing out that "adultery,
like rape and bribery, is easy to charge but often difficult to prove." Irwin v. Irwin, 416 P.2d 853,
857 (Okla. 1966). See Brim v. Brim, 532 P.2d 1403 (Okla. 1975). The court took custody of a
three year old child away from a white mother because of her sexual relationship with a black
man in her home. The court refused to rule on her fitness per se, but couched its decision in terms
of the welfare of the child.
The courts have broad discretion with only common sense as a guide, and may consider facts
such as excessive drinking, illicit affairs, emotional instability, or financial status when determin-
ing fitness of a child's prospective custodian. Podell, Peck & First, supra note 17, at 61-6.
29. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 438.
30. Another constitutional challenge to this statute arises under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment This may be accomplished by using the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine. This doctrine maintains that due process is violated where a legislative classification is
7
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The Oklahoma statute undeniably treats men and women differ-
ently with respect to child custody. In determining whether this
classification can withstand constitutional scrutiny, it must be
overbroad or underinclusive, and the presumption created by the statute is irrebuttable. See
Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644,
645 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bezanson]. The terminology employed with this analysis parallels
the language of equal protection analysis, except that the result is said to be based on a conclusive
or irrebutable presumption. The main advantage of this analysis is that the court can avoid many
policy decisions which it would be forced to make under an equal protection review. The disad-
vantage is that, if fully applied, the doctrine could invalidate all questionable classifications and
require that opportunities for individual exemptions from the challenged statutes be allowed. Id.
at 656-58; see generally Note, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974). "This remedy, (required hearing)
does not prevent the state from discriminating on the basis of the criteria chosen by the legislature.
It only requires that the individual be allowed to challenge the discrimination." I4. at 1548. The
Oklahoma statute qualifies for review under this doctrine. Recent cases decided on "conclusive"
presumption grounds indicate another available avenue for achieving equality under the law. Al-
though there is increasing dissatisfaction with the irrebuttable or conclusive presumption doctrine
among constitutional scholars, the Supreme Court has continued recently to apply the doctrine in
sex discrimination cases. Following Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), other cases have
employed this type of due process analysis. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), a Connecti-
cut statute for tuition payment purposes in the state university system presumed that the classifica-
tion of students as residents or non-residents remained the same throughout their school
attendance. The Court held the statutory presumption to be in violation of due process because
the eligibility for a lower tuition payment was predicated upon a student's residence, but a student
was not allowed to introduce any evidence to prove the fact of residence.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) involved a mandatory preg-
nancy leave rule requiring pregnant teachers to quit teaching five months before the expected
birth of the child and preventing their return for at least three months after its birth. The Court
characterized the regulations as imposing a penalty on teachers who decided to have children.
The mandatory termination provisions were said to "contain an irrebuttable presumption of phys-
ical incompetency, and that presumption applies even when the medical evidence as to an individ-
ual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary." Id. at 644. Because the rules
arbitrarily intruded into the area of marriage and family, they violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The Court in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), sum-
marized the value of the irrebuttable presumption analysis: "[W]e must assess the public and
private interests affected by a statutory classification and then decide in each instance whether
individualized determination is required or categorical treatment is permitted by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 519.
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court struck down an Illinois statute which
presumed an unwed father to be unfit to raise his children by weighing the governmental function
against the private interest affected by the state action and then holding that custody schemes were
subject to the requirements of the due process clause. The Stanley Court stated, "[P]rocedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than the individualized determination. But when. . .
the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly dis-
dains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly [jeopardizes] important inter-
ests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand." 405 U.S. at 656-57. The classification
of the statute was fatally imprecise since all unmarried fathers are not necessarily unfit guardians.
Similarly, to presume conclusively that a mother is a more fit guardian than a father in a custody
dispute arising out of a divorce action establishes an imprecise classification. Although it may be
argued that the statute does not deem fathers "unfit," and thus bar custody altogether, the infer-
ence is that they are "less fit," and the actual effect of that inference overburdens either parent's
basic civil right, a substantial interest in the upbringing of children. The inaccurate perceptions
of the legislature of who is qualified to "mother" children are aligned with what is perceived as
advancing the welfare of a child. These two presumptions combine to form a statute which must
fail for overbreadth. Bezanson, supra note 30 at n.34.
8
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evaluated under the equal protection analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court. The traditional minimal scrutiny analysis comes into play
when neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is in-
volved.3' The standard of review known as strict scrutiny is triggered
by the presence of a fundamental interest or suspect classification.
This standard requires that the state show a compelling interest to jus-
tify use of a classification treating persons differently. One commenta-
tor has stated that "[tihe Warren Court's strict scrutiny repeatedly
asked whether the means were necessary and whether less drastic meas-
ures were available to achieve the same purpose."3
A third basis of analysis is emerging as the Court strives to formu-
late a doctrine applicable to gender-based discrimination cases. This
standard, acknowledged as the "substantial interest" test, demands that
legislative classifications have a substantial relationship to legislative
purposes.33
The majority of the decisions which have found sexually discrimi-
natory laws unconstitutional have focused on discrimination against
women. However, discrimination as a denial of equal protection can
also operate against men, particularly in the area of family law, where
judicially recognized interests are at stake.3 4 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in Gordon summarily rejected any constitutional challenge
to the statute in question by suggesting that the custodial preference
embodied in the statute represents an instance "where the sex-centered
generalization actually comports [sic] to fact, "35and is constitutional
under any standard of review. However, a more thorough analysis of
the three standards of review reveals that the view of the Oklahoma
31. Justice Warren, in describing the traditional minimal scrutiny approach to equal protec-
tion, has stated:
[The Equal Protection Clause] permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961); see also, Gunther, The Supreme Court-1971
Term, Foreword In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on.A Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 19-20 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
32. Gunther, supra note 31, at 21.
33. Id.
34. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). Stanley recognized the right of a parent to
the care and comfort of his children. The privacy interests of a family and the rights of parents to
make decisions regarding their own children are a few of the substantial interests which are cen-
tral to family law issues.
35. Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d at 1277, citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 976).
[Vol. 13:802
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Supreme Court is not supported by current constitutional theories nor
by scholars in the area of family law.
Minimal Scrutiny
The dearth of legislative history in Oklahoma precludes an investi-
gation into the recorded purposes of this statute. However, a fair infer-
ence with respect to the purpose of the statute, based on its emphasis on
the "best interests of the child" doctrine, would be that Oklahoma
lawmakers subscribed to the widely accepted theory that a child's
mental and temporal welfare are of utmost importance.36 Certainly,
the legislature, having a strong interest in the welfare of the state's chil-
dren often articulated under the doctrine of parenspatriae, would not
disclaim this purpose. The opinion in Gordon categorically stated that
the classification of the Oklahoma statute serves the objective of assur-
ing that children of divorced parents will be placed with the parent best
able to care for them.37 However, application of even the minimum
constitutional standard of review to the statute reveals an absence of
any rational relationship between the maternal preference/tender years
doctrine and the purpose of the legislature.38
The old theories of maternal deprivation can now be read as gen-
eral indications of the effects of "parental" deprivation. This interpre-
tation is increasingly valid in a society which recognizes that
"mothering" is not necessarily a function of biology.39 Consequently,
a mechanical preference for the mother bears no reasonable relation-
ship to furtherance of the ideal "best interests of the child." The con-
cept that "mothers are 'natural' guardians of children. . . is merely a
corollary of the axiom that a woman's place is in the home and that
child rearing is her special responsibility."'
Continuing to enforce rigidly the legislative assumption that sex
must be the determining factor of a parental role often ignores the
36. See notes 12-14, supra and accompanying text.
37. 577 P.2d at 1276.
38. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). See also Comment, The Tender
Years Presumptior" Do the Children Bear the Burden?, 21 S.D.L. REv. 332, 346 (1976).
39. Mead, Some Theoretical Considerations on the Problem of Mother-Child Separation, 24
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 471 (1954). "[The insistence that child and biological mother ... never be
separated... is a new and subtle form of anti-feminism in which men-under the guise of ex-
alting the importance of maternity-are tying women more tightly to their children than has been
thought necessary since the invention of bottle feeding and baby carriages." Id. at 477. Com-




40. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974,49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617,
627 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Johnston].
1978]
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss4/20
TULSA LAW JOURANAL
child's real welfare. Moreover, the statute lacks any redeeming ration-
ality since the maternal preference rule negates any arguable operation
in a child's favor by forcing the father to prove the mother's unfitness in
order to assert his rights to custody, even though he may be the more
suitable parent.
Seemingly influenced by this changing notion of roles in American
society the Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,41 carefully applied what
many scholars have argued was the rational relationship test to an
Idaho statute discriminating against women as estate administrators by
mandatorily preferring men over women. The justices disposed of the
argument that administrative convenience was a legitimate state objec-
tive and declared that the statute was unconstitutional. To give prefer-
ence to males over females "merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary choice
forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment."' 4z Preferring mothers in custody disputes has the advantage of
efficiency as did the statute in Reed, since fairly weighing the informa-
tion about both parents and rendering a decision in the interests of the
child is a burdensome task. However, efficiency is no longer a consti-
tutionally valid reason for upholding an arbitrary and irrational
classification.43
The Court in Reed, also acknowledged that the family was an ap-
propriate province for some state regulation, and stated that whatever
the state's interest in "avoiding intrafamily controversy," it could not
achieve this end "solely on the basis of sex." 44 Despite the legitimacy
of state regulation of familial relations, the Oklahoma statute question-
ed in Gordon creates an impermissible distinction between the male
and female parent.
Strict Scrutiny
Arguably, the Oklahoma statute qualifies for a more rigorous stan-
dard of review than mere rationality. "For classifications regarded as
'suspect' and for rights ranked as 'fundamental' the strict scrutiny stan-
dard applies, a standard requiring the proponent of the classification to
41. 404 U.S. 76 (1971). See Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Princglle of Sexual
Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 159-160 [hereinafter cited as Getman].
42. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 76, 76 (1971).
43. Id. Cases prior to Reed had upheld administrative convenience over challenges to gen-
der based classifications. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908); see also Getman, supra note 41, at 159-160.
44. 404 U.S. at 77.
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demonstrate that a compelling state interest justifies it."45 Irrespective
of the language of Gordon denouncing sex as a suspect classification,
the fact that existing Oklahoma law denies one parent the right to raise
his child should require a careful examination of the legislative pur-
poses and means, and the state should be precluded from making any
effective "administrative convenience" argument. It is the presence of
a fundamental interest which would arguably bring the statute under
strict scrutiny analysis.4 6 The Supreme Court has frequently empha-
sized the importance of the family and the essential right to conceive
and raise one's children.4 7 In Stanley v. Illinois,48 where a putative
father sought custody of his illegitimate children, the Court virtually
recognized the custody of one's children as a fundamental right by stat-
ing that the father's interest in retaining custody was "cognizable and
substantial."49
Within the framework of both parents' rights to their children, the
parent of either sex should have equal treatment and consideration in a
custody determination. The state has traditionally asserted an interest
in the regulation of family relationships which purportedly justifies
classification of individuals.50 However, the private interest of the par-
ents overrides the state interest in family matters. 5' Furthermore, the
equality demanded provides a more adequate effectuation of the state's
goal in finding the most appropriate guardian, from the standpoint of
child's welfare, than does the preferential presumption now in force. 52
45. Ginsberg, Gender in the Supreme Court, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 11. [hereinafter cited as
Ginsberg].
46. Recognized fundamental rights include the right to vote, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965); the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right of a
parent to the comfort of his child, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
47. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
48. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
49. Id. at 652.
50. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971). The state was allowed to deny inheritance
rights to illegitimate children as an aspect of its "power to make rules to establish, protect, and
strengthen family life. ."
51. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).52. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 441. Qualifications of both parents in regard to cus-
tody would be evaluated and the burden of proving a mother's unfitness would be lifted. The
language of Justice Brennan in Frontiero, although used in making reference to discrimination
against women, is applicable when arguing for either sex where gender based discrimination sur-
faces:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of
a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility...'
And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect statutes as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic
12
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Another significant case bearing on an analysis of the Oklahoma
statute is Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, an unanimous Supreme Court
decision declaring unconstitutional the portion of the Social Security
Act 4 which granted benefits to a deceased husband's widow and minor
children, but which extended no such benefits to a widower. Although
the decision did not actually delineate which standard of review was
being applied, the case was decided subsequent to Frontiero v.
Richardson," and the Court held that "the gender based distinction
. . . is indistinguishable from that invalidated in Frontiero."56  The
classification was found to be based on an archaic and overly broad
generalization. Enabling a surviving parent to remain at home to care
for a child was shown as the purpose of the statute; however, the
classification established by the statute discriminated against some sur-
viving children solely on the basis of the gender of the surviving
parent. 7 The Court in effect sought role neutrality in the statute and
accomplished it by striking down a gender classification, while arguing
for a functional description, i.e., sole surviving parent. 8
An obvious analogy can be drawn between the statute in
Weinberger and the Oklahoma statute. Citing Stanley, the Court in
Weinberger proclaimed that "a father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the 'companionship, care, custody,
and management' of 'the children he has sired and raised,' [which] un-
deniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection.' "' The father in a custody dispute against the
mother should be placed on an equal footing with the mother to afford
protection of his fundamental right to rear his children and to prevent
discrimination among the plethora of children whose interests are at
stake in custody disputes, but whose interests may be overlooked when
custodial preference is statutorily awarded to the mother.
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (plurality opinion) [emphasis added]. Therefore,
there does exist an alternative means less restrictive and more advantageous with respect to the
best interests of the children involved in custody proceedings; that is, equal consideration of both
parents in the selection process of a minor child's custodian.
53. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1971).
55. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
56. 420 U.S. at 642.
57. Id. at 651.
58. See Ginsberg, supra note 45, at 14.
59. 420 U.S. at 652.
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In Frontiero v. Richardson,6 ° a plurality of the Court embraced the
argument that sex is an inherently suspect classification because "the
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or to
contribute to society."'" The Court struck down a statute which al-
lowed male Air Force officers to claim their wives as dependents but
denied female officers the same right unless they could prove they pro-
vided more than fifty percent of their husbands' support.
Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court has hesi-
tated in finding sex a suspect classification, if strict scrutiny was applied
to the Oklahoma statute in question based upon sex as a suspect
classification, as suggested in Frontiero, the statute would most cer-
tainly fail the test. A similar Oklahoma statute,62 which discriminated
against wives in the right to sue for loss of consortium, was struck down
as unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In that
case, Duncan v. General Motors Corp.,63 the Court relied directly on
Frontiero, proclaiming sex to be a suspect classification and noting that
husband and wife "both have equal rights in the marriage relation, and
both should receive equal protection under the law."'6
Admittedly, the state has a compelling interest in providing well-
qualified guardians for minor children, but an arbitrary preference for
mothers over fathers can no longer be viewed as a legitimate distinction
between the sexes.
The Intermediate "Substantial Relationship" Test
Hesitancy in recognizing sex as a suspect classification and dissat-
isfaction with traditional equal protection analysis has characterized
the mood of the Supreme Court with regard to gender-based classifica-
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
61. Id. at 684-87. Although Frontiero may be considered a breakthrough in the area of sex
discrimination in that a plurality of the Court embraced the view of sex as a suspect classification,
a majority was not yet willing to take this approach because of the far reaching implications.
However, many lower courts have recognized the suspect nature of gender classifications and have
relied directly upon the Frontiero decision, or at least agreed with such an approach while noting
the plurality opinion. For cases which accept Frontiero without qualification, see Duncan v.
General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1974); Andrews v. Drew Municipal School
Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27, 35-36 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643, 647-48 (S.D.
Cal. 1973); Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624, 627 (N.D. 1973). For cases in support of Front/ero,
noting the lack of precedential value, see Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D. Ky.
1974); Gilpin v. Kansas High School Activities Ass'n., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974);
Weisenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981, 990-91 (D. NJ. 1973);
Stem v. Massachusetts Indemn. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also note
65, infra.
62. OKLA. STAT. tit 32, § 15 (1971).
63. 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 838.
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tions.65 Alternatively, the Court has applied the emerging model of
review which blends strict and minimal scrutiny in requiring a substan-
tial relationship to legislative purposes when a statute is constitution-
ally challenged.66  'The more modest interventionism, [by contrast]
would permit the state to select any means that substantially furthered
the legislative purpose."67 With this approach, the means rather than
the legislative ends undergo constitutional scrutiny. Although the lan-
guage in Reed made reference to the traditional minimal scrutiny stan-
dard, many constitutional scholars feel the approach was means
oriented68 and that for the first time gender-based classifications were
receiving somewhat closer scrutiny.69 As discussed previously in rela-
tion to Reed, the quarrel with the Oklahoma statute does not focus on
the legitimate state goal of providing for a child's best interests in se-
lecting the most appropriate guardian to foster his welfare. Rather, the
65. Since Frontiero, the Court has been unable to sustain a pattern in its method of tackling
gender-based claims of discrimination and consequently has handed down some recent decisions
which can be characterized as retreats from the emerging scheme, or at least inconsistencies in the
overall picture. In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Court upheld a Florida law granting
real property tax exemptions to widows but not widowers. The majority accepted the argument
that the statute was remedial and under the Reed standard bore a fair and substantial relation to
that stated objective. Id. at 353-55. The decision did not deal with the assertion that remedial
legislation such as the Florida tax exemption for widows reinforces the double standards which
limit women's opportunities. See Ginsberg, supra note 45, at 6. Arguably, Kahn should be read
narrowly and be limited only to questions involving taxation. The Court implied such an inter-
pretation in saying "'[w]here taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal
protection, is imperiled, the states have large leeway in making classifications.' Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973)." 416 U.S. at 359.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), was a similar retreat from the stricter review the
Court had begun to employ in sex discrimination cases. Here the Court disallowed a claim under
California's disability insurance program for work loss because of normal pregnancy. Declining
to view the statute as sex-based, the Court reasoned that "[tihere is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and
men are not." Id. at 496-97. Commentators suggest that the Supreme Court's opinion grew out
of an "assessment of childbirth not as a short-term medical episode, but as an integral part of a
long term process, a process commencing with pregnancy and ending year later when child-rear-
ing work is done." See Ginsberg, supra note 45, at 10. See generally Johnston, supra note 40, at
678-80.
Another step backward was taken when the Court handed down Schiesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975). Here, the Navy's mandatory discharge requirement for male officers who failed
to be promoted was a shorter term than the thirteen year leeway allowed female officers before
discharge for lack of promotion. The discrepancy was allowed to stand, however, since the Court
found a rational basis for the classification. Id. at 508. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977), citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court concluded that the Social Security Act survivor's benefits were
awarded discriminatorily because widowers had to prove at least 50% dependency on their de-
ceased wives' income while widows received their husbands' benefits regardless of dependency.
66. See Gunther, supra note 31, at 19-20.
67. Id. at 21.
68. See Gunther, supra note 31, at 30; see also Getman, supra note 41, at 163.
69. Ginsberg, supra note 45, at 3.
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argument centers on the means by which the state attempts to further
that goal through its statutory discrimination between the parents.
This middle tier standard of review provides the most appropriate vehi-
cle for a constitutional challenge in spite of the holding in Gordon.7 °
Under the "substantial relationship" standard, the method of ap-
pointing guardians enunciated in the Oklahoma statute cannot logi-
cally be said to "significantly" relate to legislative purposes.7 '
Stanton v. Stanton,72 citing Reed as controlling, took judicial no-
tice of the changing roles of women in American society.7 3 The Court
consequently found that the different ages of majority for boys and
girls in regard to parental support obligations violated the equal protec-
tion clause. Quoting from Reed, the Court noted that "[a] classifica-
tion 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon sound
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.' " In conclusion, the Court stepped beyond strict ad-
herence to one particular standard of review and announced it "unnec-
essary. . . to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently
suspect""5 because the age differential between male and female failed
to survive an equal protection attack "under any test-compelling state
70. 577 P.2d at 1276.
71. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court invalidated a Louisiana
workmen's compensation law which denied death benefits to illegitimate children of a decedent,
while allowing the benefits for legitimate children. The classification between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children bore no "significant" relationship to the purpose of supporting dependent chil-
dren generally. There, as in this situation involving the Oklahoma statute, the state interest in
regulating family relationships was acknowledged but the form of regulation was not acceptable.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Reinforcing general stereotypes about the social
roles of men and women repeatedly shown to be outdated, and denying fathers equal treatment
where the right to custody of one's children is involved, are means imposed by the Oklahoma
statute, bearing no substantial relationship to the legislative end. Ginsberg, supra note 45, at 23.
72. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
73. The Court noted:
A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world
of ideas. Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. . .The
presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all
walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is
apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is re-
quired for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he attains his education
and training, so, too, it is for the girl. To distinguish between the two on educational
grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she
hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to
an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.
Id. at 14-15.
74. 421 U.S. at 14.
75. Id. at 13.
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interest, or rational basis, or something in between. . ... -6 Relying
upon Stanton, the argument against the validity of the Oklahoma stat-
ute gains momentum. A parent, mother or father, is still a parent, and
a distinction between them cannot be rationally related to a determina-
tion of custody purportedly focusing on the welfare of the child.7
IV. RECENT TRENDS
The 1973 New York decision, State ex rel Walls v. Watts,78 was a
concise explication of the practical and constitutional flaws of the statu-
tory presumption favoring the mother in custody disputes. This case,
in which the mother and father were each suing for custody of the
couple's three children, held that "sound application of the 'best inter-
ests of the child' criteria requires that the court not place a greater bur-
den on the father in proving suitability for custody than on the
mother."7 9  Garrett v. Garre/,80 cited by the New York court, points
out that the maternal preference rule should be "softened by the reali-
zation that all things never are exactly equal""' and that the essential
considerations reside in the act of motherhood, not the fact of mother-
hood. Relying on Frontiero,82 the Court found the classification em-
bodied in the maternal presumption rule to be "suspect" and unable to
withstand the strictest judicial scrutiny. The presumption was analo-
gized to Danielson v. Board of Higher Education, 3 in which a federal
district court indicated the unconstitutionality of allowing child care
leaves for mothers but not for fathers. The court in Walls stated that
"arbitrary assumptions about which spouse is better suited to care for
young children are no more permissible" 4 in custody determinations
than they are in child care leave situations.
Prompted by Supreme Court decisions, many states have amended
their domestic relations laws to achieve informed implementation of
the "best interests of the child" doctrine, indicating an awareness and
acceptance of contemporary views of child development and male and
76. Id. at 17.
77. In the recent case of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court struck down an
Oklahoma law embodying an age differential for males and females for the purchase of 3.2% beer.
Citing Reed as controlling, the Court found the statute was not "substantially related to achieve-
ment of the statutory objective." Id. at 204.
78. 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973); but see Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d 1019 (Utah, 1974).
79, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
80. 464 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. App. 1971).
81. Id. at 742.
82. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
83. 358 F. Supp. 22 ($.D.N.Y. 1972).
84. 350 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
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female stereotypes.8 ' Although these states have mooted the constitu-
tional issues through legislative action, a constitutional challenge may
be the appropriate in-road in those states which cling to inaccurate pre-
sumptions about social roles and the needs of children. The Constitu-
tion remains viable today because of its ability to reflect our cultural
evolution.
Unfortunately, however, declaring an existing statute unconstitu-
tional or effecting a statutory change through legislative action may not
necessarily insure that the judicial decisions in custody disputes will
abandon an inclination to favor mothers over fathers. Without more,
a ban against utilization of the maternal preference doctrine is arguably
unenforceable. The prospect of unenforceability requires considera-
tion of how the suggested statutory change could be practically imple-
mented. 6
V. CONCLUSION
Oklahoma's statutory approach to awarding custody of young
children inhibits decisions founded upon what is best for the children.
It also denies a father equality in court when his right to the guardian-
ship of his children becomes a matter for judicial determination. The
maternal preference statute in Oklahoma must submit to a constitu-
tional challenge under any equal protection standard. Recent
Supreme Court decisions questioning the validity of state legislative
purposes or means when issues of gender-based discrimination arise
can only serve to illustrate to Oklahoma that the time for change has
arrived.
Marcia Trotter
85. Wisconsin, a recognized progressive leader in trends in the area of family law, revised its
law in 1971 to read: "In determining the parent with whom a child shall remain, the court shall
consider all facts in the best interest of the child and shall not prefer one parent over the other
solely on the basis of the sex of the parent." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(3) (West Supp. 1977).
Other states similarly have repealed provisions giving a mother preference over a father for the
custody of children of tender years and have enacted laws expressly prohibiting discrimination
against the father. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (Supp. 1977); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600
(West Supp. 1977). See in connection with California's amendment, Comment, 4 PAC. L. J. 427
(1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West Supp. 1977); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.17 (West Supp.
1977); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 14-10-124 (Supp. 1976).
86. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 423.
1978)
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss4/20
